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"NEITHER FORCE NOR WILL" 
L.H. LaRue* 
If we are to choose which provision of the constitution has 
turned out to be the stupidest, we must be allowed to use hind-
sight. In the beginning, there were provisions that made good 
sense in their day, but time has been hard on them. With the use 
of hindsight, I choose the second sentence of Section 1 of Article 
III: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall 
hold their Offices during good behaviour .... " 
Perhaps there are others who, like me, find the phrase "dur-
ing good behaviour" to be highly ambiguous. And some of these 
may even join me in finding the standard interpretation of that 
phrase rather strange. But I waive all such matters, and I am 
willing to go forward on the assumption that a community con-
sensus has settled the meaning of the phrase, which is, that our 
judges shall serve for life, unless they choose to resign, or unless 
they are impeached. Having accepted that "good behaviour" 
means "life tenure," I will say that this provision is stupid. 
However, I admit that this judgment does draw heavily upon 
the use of hindsight, and I do not wish to impugn the judgment of 
the drafters. When they wrote, the project of constitution-mak-
ing was new, and the relevant experience was lacking. Having an 
independent judiciary was more theory than reality for them, and 
they had not experienced a regime in which judges declared gov-
ernmental acts to be unconstitutional. Of course, judicial review 
was not foreign to them; they were familiar with the precedents 
and approved of the concept. Even so, it was not a lived reality. 
In setting up this new and powerful institution, they had to pro-
ceed upon assumptions, and it is not strange that some of these 
assumptions might tum out to be false. 
Consider, for example, Hamilton's famous discussion of the 
judiciary in Federalist No. 78. Recall that the context for this dis-
cussion is whether the judiciary would have the capacity to upset 
the political balance of power. 
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Whoever attentively considers the different departments 
of power must perceive that, in a government in which they 
are separated from each other, the judiciary, from the nature 
of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the polit-
ical rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a ca-
pacity to annoy or injure them. The executive not only 
dispenses the honors but holds the sword of the community. 
The legislature not only commands the purse but prescribes 
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to 
be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no intluence 
over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the 
strength or the wealth of the society, and can take no active 
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither 
FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy 
of its judgments. 
When I read this passage, I am always charmed by the ele-
gance of such classic eighteenth century prose, and it always 
takes me a little while to cast off the spell and descend to the ugly 
task of analysis. When I do, my first reaction is, "How quaint!" 
And indeed, analysis seems almost beside the point. To be 
charmed by the antique quality of this paragraph is perhaps the 
only appropriate response; Hamilton's world seems so far re-
moved from ours that it is otiose to assess his description of the 
judiciary as though it were a description of our judiciary. Con-
sider, by way of a parallel, his description of the President as dis-
pensing honors and holding the sword and his description of 
Congress as commanding the purse and prescribing rules. There 
is an antique charm to this description, but it would be both 
churlish and irrelevant to dissect it, to test its accuracy as political 
science. (Today, I suppose that one would start with the role of 
money and the mass media in politics, and go forward from that 
starting point, if one wished to talk about "the political rights of 
the Constitution.") 
We should not be surprised, of course, that we differ from 
Hamilton in our most fundamental assumptions about govern-
ment and law, but perhaps it may be worthwhile to emphasize 
that we do indeed differ from him in how we understand judging. 
For example, I do not think that many (any?) scholars would say 
today that judging does not involve "force or will." Hamilton 
was confident that he could draw a line between political will and 
judicial judgment; I think that most of us are not quick to assume 
that this can be done. 
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Perhaps one way to highlight the difference between Hamil-
ton's assumptions and ours is to look at his description of the 
"job qualifications" for a judge, which appear somewhat later in 
Federalist No. 78. 
There is yet a further and weighty reason for the perma-
nency of the judicial offices which is deducible from the nature 
of the qualifications they require. It has frequently been re-
marked with great propriety that a voluminous code of laws is 
one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the ad-
vantages of a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discre-
tion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound 
down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and 
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before 
them; and it will be readily conceived from the variety of con-
troversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of man-
kind that the records of those precedents must unavoidably 
swell to a very considerable bulk and must demand long and 
laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them. 
Hence it is that there can be but few men in the society who 
will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify them for the 
stations of judges. And making the proper deductions for the 
ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still 
smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the req-
uisite knowledge. 
We have, in recent years, witnessed some rather interesting 
controversies over judicial appointments, and I trust it takes no 
citation to remind everyone that the participants in the debates 
differed sharply about "qualifications." Your memory may differ 
from mine, but I do not recall anyone arguing that a deep, schol-
arly knowledge of the precedents was the fundamental prerequi-
site for the job. Why not? Because none of us believes that our 
judges are "bound down by strict rules and precedents which 
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case 
that comes before them." None of us believes that Hamilton has 
correctly described the type of judiciary, the type of judges, that 
we live with today. Of course, it would be foolish to criticize 
Hamilton for failing to be a prophet on this point. But I do feel 
free to criticize those among us who refuse to wake up and see 
that our reality is different. 
Let us proceed then from assumptions that match our day: 
(1) we have a strong and independent judiciary; 
(2) our judges have the power to change the law, both com-
mon law and constitutional law; 
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(3) our judges will exercise their power to change the law 
based upon their judgments about justice and utility; 
( 4) this power to change the law is not unlimited, since 
there are political, institutional, and moral restraints that all 
judges feel; 
(5) this power has been used in the past sometimes for the 
good, sometimes for the bad; 
(6) we ought to accept and continue this power, but we 
should also limit it. 
If you grant these assumptions, then the question arises: 
should we give these judges, especially those who sit on the 
Supreme Court, life tenure? Not I. I would limit their tenure. 
For example, one might guarantee life tenure as a judge, but limit 
the period for which a judge might serve on any one court. Per-
haps a Supreme Court Justice should serve on that court for only 
ten or fifteen years, and then move down to a lower court. I pick 
a term of about that length because I think that most Supreme 
Court Justices do their best work during the period of their fifth 
to tenth years. As a rough generalization, I would say that it is 
uphill to that plateau, and then downhill afterwards. By down-
hill, I don't mean that they tend to become senile. Instead, they 
just run out of new ideas; after their tenth year, almost all judges 
start defending what they did in their early career, and conse-
quently, it would be good for them to move on. Any argument 
over details of my proposal, however, would be idle, unless there 
is agreement on fundamental principle. 
Is there agreement on fundamental principle? At this point, 
I should be launching into a review of the possible arguments, 
pro and con. And were I really clever, I could use this dialectic 
of pro and con to generate the requisite fundamental principles 
by which we could assess whether changing Article III, Section 1, 
sentence 2, would be a good idea. But my imagination fails me. I 
simply can't imagine why anyone would argue that a judge 
should have life tenure on the Supreme Court. My imagination 
is not that good. 
